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1 Introduction
The Nash equilibrium (Nash [1950]) is probably the most important solution concept in
game theory. It is immune to unilateral deviations, that is, each player has no incentive to
deviate from his/her strategy given that the other players do not deviate. However, many
games have several Nash equilibria which leads to a selection problem. Some authors
proposed refinements which can be used to separate the reasonable from the unreason-
able equilibria. Among these refinements, we can cite, for example, the perfect equilib-
rium (Selten [1975]), the proper equilibrium (Myerson [1978]), the sequential equilibrium
(Kreps and Wilson [1982]). All these equilibria are related to one another in varying de-
grees. However, the ultimate refinement that exactly characterizes rational behavior can
still include multiple equilibria for many games.
Berge [1957] introduced the strong Berge equilibrium. The strong Berge equilibrium
is stable against deviation of all the players except one of them. Indeed, if a player chooses
his strategy in a strong Berge equilibrium, then he obliges all the other player to do so. As
a strong Berge equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium, we can consider it as a refinement
to this last one. The same authors showed a theorem of existence of this equilibrium.
Aumann [1959] introduced the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) which ensures a more re-
strictive stability than the Nash equilibrium. A SNE is a Nash equilibrium such that there
is a nonempty set of players who could all gain by deviating together to some other com-
bination of strategies which is jointly feasible for them, while all other players who are
not in this set are expected to maintain their equilibrium strategies. Since this requirement
applies to the grand coalition of all players, SNE must be Pareto efficient. Thus, a SNE
is not only immune to unilateral deviations, but also to deviations by coalitions. We can
then consider it as a refinement of the Nash equilibrium which is Pareto efficient.
The SNE has been used to study different noncooperative games as coalition forma-
tion (Hart and Kurz [1983], Hart and Kurz [1984], Bernhein et al. [1987], Chander and
Tulkens [1997], Le Breton and Weber [2005]), congestion games (Hotzman and Law-
Yone [1997], Voorneveld et al. [1999]), voting models (Keiding and Peleg [2001], Brams
and Sanver [2006] and Moulin [1982]), network formation (Matsubayachi and Yamakawa
[2006]), production externality games (Moulin and Shenker [1992] and Moulin [1994]),
and many others economic situations: Abreu and Sen [1991], Tian [1999], Tian [2000],
Suh [2003], Suh [1996]), Hirai et al. [2006], Konishi et al. [1997a], Konishi et al. [1997b],
Konishi et al. [1997c], Nishihara [1999], Ray [2001], Yi [1999] and Young [1998]. This
series of examples reveals the explanatory power of such equilibrium concept. However,
these contributions are also paradoxical since there does not exist a general theorem which
establishes clear existence conditions for the SNE.
In the present paper, we show that any strong Berge equilibrium which is Pareto effi-
cient (SBPE) is also a strong Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we propose necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of both an SBPE and SNE. Our result is based on
the Ky Fan inequality (Fan [1972]).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the strong Berge equilibrium,
strong Nash equilibrium and some of their properties. In section 3, we introduce the
concept of strong Berge equilibrium which is also Pareto efficient (SBPE), we show that
an SBPE is also SNE and we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of an SBPE and provid a method for its computation. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Strong Berge and Nash Equilibria
In this section, we give the definitions of a strong Berge and Nash equilibria, its interpre-
tations and some of its properties. Consider the following noncooperative game in normal
form:
G = (Xi, fi)i∈I (2.1)
where I = {1, ..., n} is the finite set of players, X =
∏
i∈I
Xi is the set of strategy profiles
of the game, where Xi is the set of strategies of player i; Xi ⊂ Ei, Ei is a vector space.
f = (f1, f2, ..., fn) where fi : X −→ R is the payoff function of player i.
The aim of each player in this game is to maximize his payoff function.
Let ℑ denote the set of all coalitions (i.e., nonempty subsets of I). For each coalition
K ∈ ℑ, we denote by −K; the set −K = {i ∈ I such that i /∈ K}: the coalition
of the players not in K, if K is reduced to a singleton {i}, we denote by −i the set
−K. We also denote by XK =
∏
i∈K
Xi the set of strategies of the players in coalition
R. If {Ki}i∈{1,..,s}⊂N is a partition of the set of players I , then any strategy profile x =
(x1, ..., xn) ∈ X can be written as x = (xK1 , xK2 , .., xKs) where xKi ∈
∏
j∈Ki
Xj .
Based on the concept of an equilibrium of a coalition R with respect to a coalition of
Berge K Berge [1957], Abalo and Kostreva Abalo and Kostreva [1996b] introduced the
following concept of equilibrium.
Definition 2.1 Consider a game (2.1). Let R = {Rt}t∈M be a partition of I and S =
{St}t∈M be a set of subsets of I . A feasible strategy x ∈ X is an equilibrium point for the
set R relative to the set S or simple a Berge equilibrium point for game (2.1) if
frm(x) ≥ frm(xSm , x−Sm),
for each given m ∈ M , any rm ∈ Rm and xSm ∈ XSm .
Abalo and Kostreva (Abalo and Kostreva [2005], Abalo and Kostreva [2004], Abalo
and Kostreva [1996a] and Abalo and Kostreva [1996b]) provide a existence theorem of
this equilibrium as Theorems 2, 3, 4, 5 and Corollary 3 (Abalo and Kostreva [2005]), The-
orems 3.1 and 3.2 (Abalo and Kostreva [2004]), Theorems 2 and 3 (Abalo and Kostreva
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[1996a]), and Theorems 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 (Abalo and Kostreva [1996b]). Nessah et al.
[2007] found that the assumptions given in the Abalo and Kostreva’s Theorem are not suf-
ficient for the existence of Berge equilibrium and the same authors proposed a condition
that overcomes the difficulty in these papers.
Let M = I , consider Ri = {i}, for any i ∈ I . It is obvious that the family R =
{Ri}i∈I is a partition of the set of players I , and let Si = −i, for all i ∈ I . In this case
the definition 2.1 reduces to the following definition of Berge equilibrium in the sense of
Zhukovskii [1994].
Definition 2.2 A feasible strategy x ∈ X is a Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii
for game (2.1) if
fi(x) ≥ fi(x−i, xi),
for each given i ∈ I and x−i ∈ X−i.
This definition means that when a player i ∈ I plays his strategy xi from the Berge
equilibrium x, he cannot obtain a maximum payoff unless the remaining players −i will-
ingly (or obliged) play the strategy x−i from the Berge equilibrium x. In other words, if at
least one of the players of coalition −i deviates from his equilibrium strategy, the payoff
of the player i in the resulting strategy profile would be at most equal to his payoff fi(x)
in Berge equilibrium. This equilibrium can be used as an alternative solution when there
is no Nash equilibrium or when there are many in a game.
2.1 Strong Berge Equilibrium
Berge [1957] introduced the strong Berge equilibrium which is a refinement of a Nash
equilibrium as shown by Larbani and Nessah [2001]. In this section, we recall the defini-
tion of strong Berge equilibrium and its properties.
Definition 2.3 (Larbani and Nessah [2001]) A strategy profile x ∈ X is said to be strong
Berge equilibrium (SBE) of game (2.1), if
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ −i, fj(xi, y−i) ≤ fj(x), ∀y−i ∈ X−i. (2.2)
If a player i chooses his strategy xi of a x which is a SBE, then the coalition−i cannot
improve the earnings of all its players, i.e. by deviating from x. In other words, SBE is
stable against deviations of any coalition of type −i, i ∈ I .
1. The SBE is very stable. Indeed, if a player i ∈ I chooses his (her) strategy xi in
a SBE, then he obliges all the players in the coalition −i to choose their strategies
in the same SBE; if any player j in −i deviates from his strategy xj , he will not be
better off.
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2. SBE is also a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, let x ∈ X be a SBE of game (2.1), and
let i ∈ I , suppose that, player i choose a strategy xi, then for all j ∈ −i, we have
fi(xi, x−i) = fi(xj, x−{i,j}, xi) ≤ fi(x). Since i is arbitrarily chosen in I , then x is
a Nash equilibrium.
3. SBE is individually rational, i.e., the SBE gives
any player at least the minimum profit that he can guaranteed against all possible
behaviors of the coalition −i.
4. In general, the SBE is not Pareto optimal, i.e., the SBE does not satisfy the collective
rationality principle.
5. If n = 2, then the concepts of strong Berge equilibrium and Nash equilibrium are
identical.
The following Lemmas Larbani and Nessah [2001] show that SBE has exactly the
same characteristics Nash equilibrium has in two-person zero-sum games, namely, the
interchangeability and the equivalence.
Lemma 2.1 Let the game (2.1) be a zero-sum, i.e.,
n∑
i=1
fi(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ X.
If x and x˜ are two different SBE for the game (2.1), then ∀i ∈ I , fi(x) = fi(x˜).
Lemma 2.2 Assume that
n∑
i=1
fi(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ X.
Let xl, l = 1, ..., s and s = 1, ..., n be s different SBEs of game (2.1) and let {Kl}l=1,...,s
be a partition of the set players I such that for any i ∈ Kl, the player i chooses his (her)
strategy in SBE xl, then x˜ = (xK1 , xK2 , ...., xKs) is also an SBE of game (2.1).
Lemma 2.1 shows that in a game with a zero-sum, the SBE has the equivalence prop-
erty, i.e., the payoff functions have the same value for all SBE’s. In this case, contrary
to the Nash equilibrium, for the players, the problem of selection of SBE where it will
choose their strategy, does not arise. Lemma 2.2 shows that in a zero-sum game, the SBE
has the interchangeability property, i.e., if the players choose their strategies in various
SBEs, the obtained strategy profile is also an SBE. Let us note that this property is not
true for Nash equilibrium in games involving n > 2 players. Thus, we can conclude that
SBE is a ”solution” for an n-person non cooperative zero-sum game, as Nash equilibrium
is a ”solution” for two-person Zero-sum games.
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Theorem 2.1 (Larbani and Nessah [2001]) Assume that
1. the strategy sets Xi, i ∈ I are nonempty compact and convex subsets of locally
convex Hausdorff spaces,
2. ∀i ∈ I, the payoff function fi(x) is continuous over X and the function y−i 7→
fj(xi, y−i) is quasi-concave over X−i, forallj 6= i ∈ I and ∀xi ∈ Xi;
3. ∀x ∈ X , ∃u ∈ X , such that
fj(xi, y−i) ≤ fj(xi, u−i), ∀i ∈ I , ∀j ∈ −i, ∀y−i ∈ X−i.
Then the game (2.1) has at least one strong Berge equilibrium.
2.2 Strong Nash Equilibrium
Aumann [1959] introduced the strong Nash equilibrium which is a refinement of the Nash
equilibrium and which is also a Pareto efficient. In this section, we recall the definition of
strong Nash equilibrium and its properties.
Definition 2.4 A strategy profile x ∈ X is said to be strong Nash equilibrium(SNE) of
game G (2.1), if ∀S ∈ ℑ, ∀yS ∈ XS , the following system:
fj(yS, x−S) ≥ fj(x), j ∈ S (2.3)
with at least one strict inequality is impossible.
A strategy profile is a strong Nash equilibrium if no coalition (including the grand
coalition, i.e., all the players collectively) can profitably deviate from the prescribed pro-
file. The definition immediately implies that any strong Nash equilibrium is both Pareto
efficient and a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, if a coalition S deviates from its strategy xS
some strong Nash equilibrium x, then she cannot improve the earning of all his(her) play-
ers at the same time if the rest of the players maintains its strategy x−S of the x. This
equilibrium is stable with regard to the deviation of a coalition.
We deduce the following properties:
1. SNE is a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to consider S = {i} in Definition 2.4.
2. SNE is an optimum of Pareto, it suffices to consider S = I in Definition 2.4.
4. SNE is an element in α-core.
5. SNE is an element in β-core.
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6. SNE is also an k-equilibrium, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Proposition 2.1 If n = 2, then the concepts of strong Berge-Pareto equilibrium and
strong Nash equilibrium are identical.
The following lemma characterizes the strong Nash equilibrium of the game (2.1).
Lemma 2.3 A strategy profile x ∈ X is a strong Nash equilibrium of the game (2.1) if
and only if, for each S ∈ ℑ, the strategy xS ∈ XS is a pareto efficient of the following
sub-game 〈XS, fj(., x−S)j∈S〉.
Proof. It is a straightforward consequence of Definition 2.4.
3 Existence Results
Let us recall the following definition of Pareto efficient.
Definition 3.1 (Moulin [1979]) A strategy profile x ∈ X of the game (2.1) is said to be
Pareto efficient if the system fj(y) ≥ fj(x), j ∈ I with at least one strict inequality is
impossible.
We denote by PE the set of all strategy profiles Pareto efficient.
Definition 3.2 x ∈ X is said to be strong Berge and Pareto equilibrium (SBPE) of game
(2.1), if x is a strong Berge equilibrium which is also Pareto efficient of the same game.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Any SBPE of the game (2.1) is also an SNE for this game.
Proof. Let x ∈ X be an SBPE of the game (2.1), then by definition, we have:{
1) ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ −i, fj(xi, y−i) ≤ fj(x), ∀y−i ∈ X−i
2) x is a Pareto efficient.
(3.1)
Suppose that x is not SNE, then there exists S0 ∈ ℑ and y˜S0 ∈ XS0 such that:{
1) ∀h ∈ S0, fh(y˜S0 , x−S0) ≥ fh(x),
2) ∃h ∈ S0, fh(y˜S0 , x−S0) > fh(x).
(3.2)
The system (3.2) implies that∑
h∈S0
fh(y˜S0 , x−S0) >
∑
h∈S0
fh(x). (3.3)
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Case 1. If S0 = I . Inequality (3.2), implies that x is not Pareto efficient for the game
(2.1). This contradicts assumption 2) of system (3.1).
Case 2. If S0 6= I , then −S0 6= ∅. Let i0 ∈ S0, thus, S0 ⊂ −i0. Let L = (−i0)−S0, then
we have by assumption 1) of the system (3.1):
∀j ∈ −i0 = S0 ∪ L, fj(xi0 , y−i0) ≤ fj(x), ∀y−i ∈ X−i.
Let y−i0 = (xL, y˜S0), ∀j ∈ S0 and y−i0 = x−i0 , ∀j ∈ L in the last inequality, then
we obtain
∀j ∈ S0, fj(x−S0 , y˜S0) ≤ fj(x). (3.4)
The system (3.4) implies that
∑
j∈S0
fj(x−S0 , y˜S0) ≤
∑
j∈S0
fj(x). This contradicts in-
equality (3.3).
This completes the proof.
In the following theorem, we establish the existence of SBPE of game (2.1) by the Ky
Fan Inequality.
Ky Fan Inequality. Let X be a nonempty, convex and compact set in a locally convex
Hausdorff space E and let f be a real valued function defined on X × X . Suppose that
the following conditions are satisfied
1) the function x 7→ f(x, y) is continuous over X , ∀y ∈ X and the function y 7→
f(x, y) is lower semicontinuous over X , ∀x ∈ X ,
2) the function y 7→ Ψ(x, y) is quasi-concave over X , ∀x ∈ X .
Then, there exists x ∈ X such that
sup
y∈X
Ψ(x, y) = Ψ(x, x) ≤ sup
y∈X
Ψ(y, y).
Let
∆ = {λ = (λ1, .., λn) ∈ R
n/ λi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n and
∑
j∈I
λj = 1}.
be the simplex of Rn. Let us consider the following function.
ψλ : X × (X˜ ×X) → R
defined by (x, (y˜, z)) 7→ ψλ(x, (y˜, z)) =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈−i
{fj(xi, y−i) − fj(x)} +
∑
j∈I
λj{fj(z) −
fj(x)}, where X˜ = ( Π
i∈I
Π
j∈−i
Xj−i) with X
j
−i = X−i, ∀i ∈ I , ∀j ∈ −i and λ =
(λ1, ..., λn) ∈ ∆.
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Remark 3.1 We have:
∀x ∈ X, sup
(y˜,z)∈X˜×X
ψλ(x, (y˜, z)) ≥ 0,
because for any x ∈ X , if we take y˜ = ((x−1, ..., x−1︸ ︷︷ ︸)
(n−1) times
, (x−2, ..., x−2︸ ︷︷ ︸)
(n−1) times
, ..., (x−n, ..., x−n︸ ︷︷ ︸)
(n−1) times
)
and z = x, we obtain ψλ(x, (y˜, z)) = 0.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 Assume that:
1. the strategy sets Xi, i ∈ I , are nonempty compact and convex subsets of locally
convex Hausdorff spaces,
2. ∀i ∈ I, the function fi(x) is continuous and quasi-concave over X;
3. ∃λ ∈ ∆ with λi > 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n, and ∀x ∈ X , ∃u ∈ X , such that
fj(xi, y−i) ≤ fj(xi, u−i), ∀i ∈ I , ∀j ∈ −i, ∀y−i ∈ X−i
and
∑
h∈I
λhfh(z) ≤
∑
h∈I
λhfh(u), ∀z ∈ X .
Then the game (2.1) has at least one SBPE which is also an SNE.
Proof. Let us consider the following function:
Ωλ : X ×X → R
defined by (x, y) 7→ Ωλ(x, y) =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈−i
{fj(xi, y−i)− fj(x)}+
∑
h∈I
λh{fh(y)− fh(x)}.
From assumption 3) of Theorem 3.2, we deduce that ∀x ∈ X , ∃u ∈ X , such that
ψλ(x, (y˜, z)) ≤ Ωλ(x, u), ∀(y˜, z) ∈ X˜ ×X. (3.5)
From assumptions 1)-2) of Theorem 3.2, we deduce that x 7→ Ωλ(x, u) is continuous over
X , ∀u ∈ X and the function u 7→ Ωλ(x, u) is quasi-concave overX , ∀x ∈ X . Since Ωλ is
defined on the compact and convex X , then all conditions of Ky Fan Inequality Theorem
are satisfied. Consequently, ∃x ∈ X such that sup
u∈X
Ωλ(x, u) ≤ sup
u∈X
Ωλ(u, u).
By construction of Ωλ, we have Ωλ(u, u) = 0, ∀u ∈ X . Therefore,
sup
u∈X
Ωλ(x, u) ≤ 0. (3.6)
R. Nessah, T. Tazdait & M. Larbani / ............ 10
Inequalities (3.5) and (3.6) implies sup
(y˜,z)∈X˜×X
ψλ(x, (y˜, z)) ≤ 0. According to Remark 3.1,
we obtain:
sup
(y˜,z)∈X˜×X
ψλ(x, (y˜, z)) = 0.
Therefore,∑
i∈I
∑
j∈−i
{fj(xi, y−i)− fj(x)}+
∑
j∈I
λj{fj(z)− fj(x)} ≤ 0, ∀(y˜, z) ∈ X˜ ×X. (3.7)
Letting y−i = x−i, ∀i ∈ I and ∀j ∈ −i in (3.7), it becomes:
∑
j∈I
λj{fj(z) − fj(x)} ≤ 0,
∀z ∈ X which implies that x is a Pareto efficient strategy profile of the game (2.1).
Letting z = x, in (3.7), it becomes:∑
i∈I
∑
j∈−i
{fj(xi, y−i)− fj(x)} ≤ 0, ∀y˜ ∈ X˜. (3.8)
Now let us prove that:
∀y−i ∈ X−i, fj(xi, y−i) ≤ fj(x), ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ −i.
i.e. x is an SBE. Let i0 and j0 be two elements of I such that j0 ∈ −i0.
For i ∈ −i0, j ∈ −i, let y
j
−i = x−i and for i = i0, j ∈ −{j0, i0}, y
j
−i = x−i, then (3.8)
becomes
∀yj0I−i0 ∈ XI−i0 , fj0(xi0 , y
j0
I−i0
) ≤ fj0(x).
Since i0 and j0 are arbitrarily chosen in I . Then,
∀y−i ∈ X−i, fj(xi, y−i) ≤ fj(x), ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ −i.
We conclude that x is an SBPE of the game (2.1) and, by Theorem 3.1, x is an SNE of
the game (2.1).
Let us consider the following function:
Γ : X × X˜ → R
defined as (x, y˜) 7→ Γ(x, y˜) =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈−i
{fj(xi, y−i)− fj(x)}.
Then, ∀(x, y˜) ∈ X × X˜ , we have Γ(x, y˜) = ψλ(x, (y˜, x)), ∀λ ∈ ∆.
Taking into account to Remark 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we deduce the following propo-
sition.
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Proposition 3.1 Suppose that in the game (2.1) fi is continuous on X and Xi is compact,
for i ∈ I .
Let PE be the set of Pareto efficient strategy profiles of the game (2.1) and define
α = min
x∈PE
max
y˜∈X˜
Γ(x, y˜). (3.9)
Then the following propositions are equivalent:
1. game (2.1) has at least one SBPE.
2. α = 0.
Note that α exists because of compactness and continuity assumptions in Proposition 3.1.
Remark 3.2 If all conditions of Proposition 3.1 are satisfied, then the set PE is is
nonempty for the game (2.1), i.e., PE 6= ∅. Indeed, the functions fi, i ∈ I , are con-
tinuous over the compact X = Π
i∈I
Xi, then by the Weierstrass theorem, there exists x ∈ X
such that
max
x∈X
n∑
i=1
fi(x) =
n∑
i=1
fi(x).
Which implies that x is Pareto efficient for the game (2.1).
Remark 3.3 From Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.1, we deduce that if α = 0, then the
game (2.1) has at least one SNE.
From Proposition 3.1, we deduce the following method for the computation of SBPE
of the game (2.1).
Suppose that all conditions of the Proposition 3.1 are satisfied.
Step 0. Compute the set of Pareto efficient PE of game (2.1).
Step 1. Calculate the value α in (3.9).
Step 2.
If α > 0, then game (2.1) has no SBPE.
If α = 0, then a strategy profile x ∈ X verifying max
y˜∈X˜
Γ(x, y˜) = 0 are SBPE of
game (2.1).
Figure 1: Procedure for the determination of a SBPE
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In the above procedure for computation of an SBPE, it is necessary to compute the set
PE, which may be difficult. In the following, we establish another procedure that does
not require the knowledge of the set PE. For this purpose we will use the notion weakly
Pareto efficient strategy profile.
Definition 3.3 (Moulin [1979]) A strategy profile x ∈ X is said to be a weakly Pareto
efficient of game (2.1) if the following system fj(y) > fj(x), j ∈ I is impossible. We
denote by WPE the set of all strategy profile weakly Pareto efficient.
Note that it is well known that PE ⊂ WPE. We have the following Lemmas.
Lemma 3.1 (Moulin [1979]) If the set Xi is convex and function fi is strictly quasi-
concave, ∀i ∈ I , then PE = WPE.
Lemma 3.2 (Moulin [1979]) Assume that ∀i ∈ I, Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact
subset of a Hausdorff locally convex space, the functions fi, i ∈ I are continuous and
strictly quasi-concave on X .
Then x ∈ X is a weakly Pareto efficient startegy profile of the game (2.1) if and only if
∃λ ∈ ∆ such that sup
y∈X
∑
i∈I
λifi(y) =
∑
i∈I
λifi(x).
Let us consider the following function.
Υ : X ×∆× (X˜ ×X) → R
defined by Υ(x, λ, (y˜, z)) = ψλ(x, (y˜, z)).
Then, we deduce the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3 Assume that ∀i ∈ I, Xi is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of a
locally convex Hausdorff space, the functions fi, i ∈ I are continuous and strictly quasi-
concave on X . Let
β = min
(x,λ)∈X×∆
max
(y˜,z)∈X˜×X
Υ(x, λ, (y˜, z)). (3.10)
Then, the game (2.1) has at least one SBPE if and only if β = 0.
Proof. Sufficient Condition: Suppose that β = 0, since the functions x 7→
Υ(x, λ, (y˜, z)) and λ 7→ Υ(x, λ, (y˜, z)) are continuous over the compacts X and ∆, re-
spectively. Then Weierstrass Theorem implies that there exist x ∈ X and λ ∈ ∆ such that
β = max
(y˜,z)∈X˜×X
Υ(x, λ, (y˜, z)) = 0, this equality implies ∀y˜ ∈ X˜ , ∀z ∈ X ,
Υ(x, λ, (y˜, z)) =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈−i
{fj(xi, y−i)− fj(x)}+
∑
j∈I
λj{fj(z)− fj(x)} ≤ 0. (3.11)
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Letting z = x in (3.11), we obtain then∑
i∈I
∑
j∈−i
{fj(xi, y−i)− fj(x)} ≤ 0.
Thus x is an SBE of the game (2.1) (See the Proof of Theorem 3.2).
From the assumptions of Theorem 3.3 and Lemma 3.1, we deduce that PE=WPE.
Then it is sufficient to prove that x is a weakly Pareto efficient strategy profile of the game
(2.1). Suppose the contrary is true, then there exists z0 ∈ X such that:
∀j ∈ I, fj(z0) > fj(x). (3.12)
Since λj ∈ ∆, the system (3.12) implies that
∑
j∈I
λjfj(z0) >
∑
j∈I
λjfj(x). This contradicts
the inequality (3.11), if we take z = z0 and y−i = x−i, ∀i, j in (3.11). This completes the
first part of the proof.
Necessary Condition: Let x ∈ X be an SBPE of the game (2.1). Then from Lemma
3.1 and Lemma 3.2, we deduce there exists λ ∈ ∆ such thatmax
z∈X
∑
i∈I
λi{fi(z)−fi(x)} = 0.
Since x is an SBE, then
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈−i
{fj(xi, y−i)− fj(x)} ≤ 0, ∀y˜ ∈ X˜ . We conclude that
max
(y˜,z)∈X˜×X
Υ(x, λ, (y˜, z)) = 0.
Thus, we have:
β = min
(x,λ)∈X×∆
max
(y˜,z)∈X˜×X
Υ(x, λ, (y˜, z)) ≤ max
(y˜,z)∈X˜×X
Υ(x, λ, (y˜, z)) = 0. (3.13)
Remark 3.1 and (3.13) imply that β = 0. This completes the proof.
Remark 3.4 From Theorems 3.1-3.3, we deduce that if β = 0, then the game (2.1) has at
least one SNE.
From Theorem 3.3, we deduce the following procedure for the computation of SBPE
of the game (2.1).
From Theorems 3.2-3.3, we deduce the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 Assume that ∀i ∈ I, Xi is nonempty compact, the functions fi, i ∈ I are
continuous on X and ∃λ ∈ ∆ such that ∀i = 1, ..., n, λi > 0. If
βλ = min
x∈X
max
(y˜,z)∈X˜×X
Υ(x, λ, (y˜, z)) = 0 (3.14)
Then, game (2.1) has at least one SBPE.
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Suppose that all conditions of Theorem 3.3 are satisfied.
Step 0. Calculate the value of β in (3.10).
Step 2.
If β > 0, then the game (2.1) has no SBPE.
If β = 0, then the strategy profile x ∈ X verifying min
λ∈∆
max
(y˜,z)∈X˜×X
Υ(x, λ, (y˜, z) = 0
are SBPE of the game (2.1).
Figure 2: Procedure for the computation of an SBPE
Example 3.1 Let us consider the following example. Assume that in game (2.1) n = 2,
I = {1, 2}, X1 = X2 = [0, 1], x = (x1, x2) and
f1(x) = −x
2
1 − 2x1 + 2x2
f2(x) = x1 − 2x
2
2 − x2.
It is clear that the functions fi is strictly quasi-concave over X and Xi is convex for
i = 1, 2.
In this example X˜ = X2 × X1, we put ŷ = (b, a) ∈ X2 × X1, z = (c, d) ∈ X ,
x = (u, v) and µ = (λ, (1− λ)), λ ∈ [0, 1].
We have β = min
(x,µ)∈X×∆
max
ŷ∈X̂
Υ(x, ŷ) = min
λ∈[0,1]
min
u,v∈[−1,1]
max
a,b,c,d∈[−1,1]
{[f1(a, v) −
f1(u, v)]+[f2(u, b)−f2(u, v)]+[λ(f1(c, d)−f1(u, v))+(1−λ)(f2(c, d)−f2(u, v))]} =
min
u,v∈[−1,1]
min
λ∈[0,1]
max
a,b,c,d∈[−1,1]
{[−a2−2a]+[−2b2−b]+[−λc2 +(1−3λ)c]+[−2(1−λ)d2 +
(3λ− 1)d] + [(1 + λ)u2 + (1 + 3λ)u] + [2(2− λ)v2 − (2− 3λ)v]}.
Let us consider the following function.
h : [0, 1] → R
defined by λ 7→ h(λ) = min
u,v∈[−1,1]
max
a,b,c,d∈[−1,1]
{[−a2 − 2a] + [−2b2 − b] + [−λc2 + (1 −
3λ)c]+ [−2(1−λ)d2 +(3λ−1)d]+ [(1+λ)u2 +(1+3λ)u]+ [2(2−λ)v2− (2−3λ)v]}.
Note that β = min
λ∈[0,1]
h(λ).
The minimum and maximum of function Υ are reached at a˜ = b˜ = u˜ = 0,
c˜ =


1, if 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1/5
1−3λ
2λ
, if 1/5 ≤ λ ≤ 1/3
0, if 1/3 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
, d˜ =


0, if 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1/3
3λ−1
4(1−λ)
, if 1/3 ≤ λ ≤ 5/7
1, if 5/7 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
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and v˜ =
{
0, if 0 ≤ λ ≤ 2/3
3λ−2
4(2−λ)
, if 2/3 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
respectively. Then we obtain
h(λ) =


1− 4λ, if 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1/5
(3λ−1)2
4λ
, if 1/5 ≤ λ ≤ 1/3
(3λ−1)2
8(1−λ)
, if 1/3 ≤ λ ≤ 2/3
3λ2+3λ−2
8λ2−24λ+16
, if 2/3 ≤ λ ≤ 5/7
−49λ2+116λ−52
8(2−λ)
, if 5/7 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Figure 3: The graph of function h
We have β = min
λ∈[0,1]
h(λ) = h(1/3) = 0 (Figure 2.), then β = 0. According Theorem
3.3, the considered game has a SBPE such as u˜ = 0 and v˜ = 0.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the relation between strong Berge equilibrium (SBE)and
Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE. In Theorem 3.1, we showed that all strong Berge equilib-
rium and Pareto efficient startegy profiles (SBPE) are SNE. Based on the Ky fan inequal-
ity, we established sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of both SBPE and
SNE (Theorem 3.2-3.3). From the existence theorem we derived a procedure for comput-
ing SBPE and SNE. Extending the approach developed in this paper to other concepts of
equilibrium of non cooperative game may be a worthy direction of research.
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